In the conventional QALY model, people's preferences are assumed to satisfy utility independence. When health varies over time, utility independence implies that the value attached to a health state is independent of the health state that arise before or after it. In this paper we set out to test the extent to which utility independence is undermined by sequence and duration effects. Two separate studies were conducted involving a total of 155 respondents. In study one, we conducted 5 tests of utility independence using a standard gamble question. Three of the tests of utility independence were repeated in study two after randomisation was introduced in order to take account of possible ordering effects. Utility independence holds in the majority of cases examined here and so our work generally supports the use of utility independence to derive more tractable models.
Introduction
Governments are increasingly drawing upon survey techniques to incorporate people's opinions into policy, the interpretation of which often involves a set of simplifying assumptions drawn from economic theory. We investigate the application of Keeney and Raiffa's (1976) utility independence assumption to interpret people's preferences towards risky treatments when health varies over time (Drummond et al, 1997) . The descriptive validity of utility independence has been questioned by psychologists who argue that people may have preferences over the sequencing and duration of health states (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1993) . Such doubts have led to the use of alternative means of incorporating preferences that relax somewhat the assumption of utility independence (Guerrero and Herrero ,2005) .
In this paper we set out to test utility independence when health states vary over time, which, as far as we are aware, has not been previously tested. The Background reviews other authors' tests of independence for both chronic health states and when health varies over time and provides the motivation for the current study. In the Method and Results, we outline the design and main findings. These findings are further reviewed in the Discussion and we suggest ways for future research in the Conclusion.
Background
Quality adjusted life years (QALYs) are used by health economists to quantify people's preferences towards treatments that differ in terms of quality of life and life expectancy. When health states vary over time the QALY approach assumes that it is valid to estimate the utility of the health states independently of one another and simply adds these utilities (appropriately weighted by a measure of a respondent's preferences for time). For example, suppose a person experiences health state X in period 1, Y in period 2 and Z in period 3, and we represent this by the health profile XYZ. The QALY approach then estimates the utility of the profile XYZ using equation (1).
U(XYZ) = w 1 U 1 (X) + w 2 U 2 (Y) + w 3 U 3 (Z) ( 1) where w i is the time discount factor and U i (.) is the utility function at time i, for i=1,2,3.
When health states vary over time, Bleichrodt (1995) and Bleichrodt & Quiggin (1997) show that for QALYs to be a valid measure under Expected Utility Theory it is necessary to assume additive independence over disjoint time periods. Additive independence holds if the preferences between risky treatments depend only upon the marginal rather than the joint probability distributions of the health states (Bleichrodt & Quiggin, 1997, p.154; Keeney & Raiffa, 1976, p.230 and p.263, Fishburn 1965) . Under additive independence a respondent should be indifferent between a risky treatment with a 0.5 chance of profile XXX and 0.5 chance of YYY and a risky treatment with a 0.5 chance of YXX and 0. Miyamoto and Eraker (1988) found that a respondent's risk attitude towards different survival durations was unaffected by health quality and concluded that survival duration is utility independent of health quality for chronic health states. Bleichrodt and Johannesson (1997) found that utility scores are unaffected by duration after allowing for the imprecision of preferences and concluded that quality was utility independence of survival duration for chronic states. Doctor et al. (2004) (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976, p.226) . However, this utility independence assumption does not appear to have been tested which we consider to be an important omission from the literature and we aim to address in our paper. Treadwell (1998) tested a special case of utility independence, where all alternatives are certain, termed preferential independence.
Preferential independence was satisfied in the majority of cases (36 out of the 42 tests) even though his tests were designed to be sensitive to violations of preferential independence, Further, preferential independence held regardless of the discount rate used. However, preferential independence is not sufficient to imply useful models when alternatives are risky.
There is reason to doubt that utility independence will hold when health varies over time.
Psychologists have argued that respondents may have preferences over the ordering of events, known also as sequencing effects (Gafni, 1995; Ross & Simonson, 1991) . A respondent may experience 'dread' and desire to overcome ill-health in the short term or prefer to 'savour' the prospect of good health in the long term (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993) .
A respondent may also pay more attention to the final health state in a profile (Kahneman, at al 1993; Varey & Kahneman 1992 ) and under-weight earlier states. They may also adapt to health in a positive or negative manner over time (Ross & Simonson, 1991) . Guerrero and Herrero (2005) recently relaxed utility independence in a semi-separable QALY approach that allows for some sequence effects (see also Meyer Chapter 9 in Keeney and Raiffa, 1976) . In so doing, they distinguish between 'initial independence' and 'final independence'. In the former, the conditional preferences for lotteries over the final health states are independent of the initial health states. In the latter, preferences for lotteries over the initial health states are independent of the final health states. The semi-separable QALY approach requires only that 'initial independence' applies. The approach can, therefore, incorporate respondents' preferences for increasing or decreasing profiles over time. In addition, the model can allow for duration effects, whereby prolonged exposure to severe states lead to a decrease in utility. However, no information exists on the descriptive force of their conditions which is something we aim to do also in this paper.
Thus, we set out to design a study that tested utility independence and the extent to which initial and final independence holds. The aims and objectives of the study are:
To carry out a test of utility independence in risky choices for mild and severe health states.
To test the impact of changing health at the beginning or end of a health profile.
Methods
Four states were used in these profiles and were colour-coded such that normal health ( A set of 'life profiles' were developed each covering a 25 years period, made up of 5 periods of 5 years. In the notation that we use NNNBB denotes 15 years in normal (N), followed by 10 in the severe disability (B), whereas YNNNN denotes 5 years in the mild disability (Y)
followed by 20 years in normal health.
The test of utility independence was based on a SG question that it is commonly used in health economics to elicit utilities of health states 1 . Respondents were first asked a 'practice' SG question in order to familiarise them with the response format. This question asked them 1 Keeney and Raiffa's test of utility independence in the QALY model would involve setting the probability of the risky treatment at 0.5, and asking respondents to vary outcomes in the certain treatment to compensate for variations in the severity of health in period i . We considered that it would be difficult to ask respondents to vary the severity of health in this manner. In contrast, we set the outcomes and asked respondents to vary the probability of the risky treatment to compensate for variations in the severity of health in period i . Adapting the question in this way allowed us to base the test on a SG question that it is commonly used in health economics to elicit utilities of health states.
to compare a risky treatment with NNNNN (25 years in normal health) as the best outcome and DDDDD (death 25 years early) as the worst outcome, to the certainty of NNDDD (10 years in normal health followed by death). Respondents were then presented with a table that showed the chances of success and failure associated with the risky treatment. For each chance of success and failure they were asked to consider whether they preferred the certainty, preferred the risky treatment, or found it too hard to choose between those two options and the mid-point value was taken between the choices they found hard to choose).
Respondents were encouraged to consider the top and bottom of the table first and state their preference and to then work through the rest of the rows at their own speed.
After completing the practice question, respondents were presented with five tests of utility independence, each test comprising of two SG questions, A and B, making ten SG questions in all. For each question the chances of success and failure were given in a table in a SG booklet.
The null hypothesis is that utility independence holds and p A = p B . In each case, the two 'halves' of the independence test were answered consecutively. This was done in order to minimise the possibility that any differences detected between the two treatments were due to 'random noise' by encouraging respondents to compare parts A and B directly.
Tests 1 and 5 explore the impact of changing the health state in the last period from normal health to the severe disability. Evidence that preferences are affected by the final health states in these tests would be consistent with the semi-separate QALY approach of Guerrero and Herrero (2005) but not the conventional QALY model. Tests 1 and 5 also allows an examination of the extent to which responses are consistent between questions since the best and worst outcomes associated with these risky treatments are identical. For consistency we would expect the chance at which a respondent is indifferent in 1A to be lower than in 5A, and that in 1B to be lower than in 5B, since the certain outcome is worse in 1A compared to 5A, and worse in 1B compared to 5B. Tests 2 and 3 explore the impact of changing the health state in the first period from normal health to severe disability (test 2) or to mild disability (test 3). It is important to note that both Guerrero and Herrero's (2005) Test 4 examines the impact of changing the health state in the first and second period from normal health to severe disability. Test 4 differs from all the other tests in two main ways: a) health changes for 10 years across the two 'halves' of the test and b) there is a prospect of premature death in the worst outcome. It seems plausible that both serve to increase the salience of the severity of the disability, making violations of independence more likely.
We first carried out a series of paired sample t-tests, in each case comparing responses to part A and part B, using a significance level of 5%. We corrected for repeated testing by reducing the significance level of each test following the procedure suggested by Bonferroni (Maxwell and Delaney, 1990 A convenience sample of students registered at the Economics Department at Queen Mary University of London was used. Students who took part in the study were naive to the hypothesis being tested and to methods used to measure health state utility. Between 10 and 20 students took part in each session. The researcher illustrated the SG questions using overhead slides and checked that respondents understood the practice question. The students were then asked to progress through the SG booklet at their own speed.
Results of study one
The sample comprised of 64 respondents, 37 males, 27 females with a mean age of 21. It is only in test 5 that we do find a significant difference, in particular, a significantly greater number of respondents set the indifference value of p higher in question 5A than in 5B (p A > p B ). Further, the null hypothesis of independence for test 5 is still rejected after the significance level is adjusted in order to allow for repeated tests (in this case, to p=0.01).
This finding is slightly puzzling as test 5 was identical to test 1 other than the duration of severe health under the certain outcome.
Caveats to study one
In study one, utility independence was found to hold in general although we did find a significant difference in the case of one of the tests -namely test 5 -whereby respondents were significantly more likely to set p higher in part A than part B. We identified a number of caveats to the tests carried out in study one. First, it seemed plausible that a sample of economic students, even with no specific knowledge of the QALY model and naïve to the hypothesis under examination, may have a desire to give responses that are apparently 'consistent' or 'rational'. By presenting the two halves of the test consecutively in each case may have made it more likely that they identified what the 'rational' response was in each case. Further, we did not randomise the order of the parts to each test, with part A -the 'better' half of the test -always preceding part B. This may have made the data susceptible to anchoring and adjustment effects, the impact of which being hard to predict. More importantly perhaps, we failed to randomise the order of the tests themselves, with test 5 always appearing last in the response booklet. It is impossible, therefore, to say whether the pattern uncovered between tests 1 and 5 (which were identical except for period of severe health in the certain outcome) was some sort of ordering effect.
Study two
A second study was conducted using the same sampling procedures as before, and drawing respondents from a convenience sample of students registered at the Economics Department at Queen Mary University of London. As far as possible the procedures were identical to those described in study one, again with groups of between 10-20 respondents taking part in the study. The crucial difference between the two studies being that, in study two, the tests (and 'halves' of the tests) were presented to respondents in random order and so each respondent received a booklet containing a different ordering of questions. Due to time constraints, we elected to repeat only three of the five tests carried out previously. These are shown in Table 1 
Results of study two
The sample for study two comprised of 92 respondents, 48 males, 44 females with a mean age of 20. Table 3a shows the mean, median and standard deviations of the responses, again given in terms of the chance of success where respondents were indifferent between the two treatments. Again, we would expect that the chance at which a respondent is indifferent in 1A to be lower than in 5A, and that in 1B to be lower than in 5B. Of the 92 respondents, 51
were strictly consistent in both tests (i.e. p 1A < p 5A and p 1B < p 5B , where the subscripts denote both the question and part), 15 were strictly consistent in one test and weakly consistent in the other (i.e. p 1A < p 5A and p 1B = p 5B or vice versa) 2 were weakly consistent in both tests (i.e. p 1A = p 5A and p 1B = p 5B ), 20 respondents were strictly inconsistent in at least one test (i.e. p 1A > p 5A and/or p 1B > p 5B ), whilst the pattern was indeterminate for the remaining 4 respondents due to missing data.
The results of paired t tests comparing the two 'halves' A and B of each test are given in table 3b. There is no significant difference at the 5% level between responses to parts A and B in the case of tests 4 and 5. Again, the data were re-examined after the 20 'inconsistent' respondents had been removed (those respondents who set the indifference value of p to be higher in test 1A than 5A and/or higher in 1B than 5B) with no significant change in results.
3 A random numbers generator was used to generate a random ordering of the 6 questions faced by respondents in study two.
For each of the three tests in turn, the p values without (with) 'inconsistent' respondents were as follows; 0.016 (0.008) for test one, 0.690 (0.973) for test four and 0.117 (0.417) for test five.
Contrary to the results in study one, it is only in test 1 that we now find a significant difference, in particular, a significantly greater number of respondents set the indifference value of p higher in question 1A than in 1B (p A > p B ). Further, the null hypothesis of independence for test 1 is still rejected after the significance level is adjusted in order to allow for repeated tests (in this case, to p=0.0167 as 3 comparisons were made). This finding was unexpected and is the opposite effect to which we found in the first study (recall that in study one test 5 was significant, whilst test 1 was not).
Discussion
Treadwell (1998) tests preferential independence when health varies over time under conditions of certainty. We set out to see whether independence holds under conditions of uncertainty, termed 'utility independence', and our tests are a valid test of utility independence under both Expected Utility and Non-Expected Utility models (Miyamoto & and Wakker, 1996) . Whilst our results were somewhat mixed, we find that independence generally holds in the way that we set out to examine it here. It has been shown elsewhere that, if utility independence holds then it is still possible to derive models that are tractable, even if the stronger assumption of additive independence fails (Bleichrodt, 1995) . On the face of it then, our findings are generally supportive of the use of QALYs in health care decision making, providing that an appropriate specification of the model is used (see Bleichrodt, This finding, however, runs contrary to the evidence cited that sequence and duration effects do matter to people (Ross & Simonson, 1991; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993; Kahneman, at al 1993; Varey & Kahneman 1992 ) and we consider below the possible reasons for this discrepancy . First, the task respondents undertook is fairly complex and they may have adopted 'simplifying strategies' in order to get through it. For example, respondents may have 'edited out' information that was obviously common across choices in order to simplify the task, making violations of independence less likely. Thus, if it was obvious to respondents that one period of the profile was common across the risky and certain outcomes, the severity of this common period may have been ignored altogether-guaranteeing utility independence as assessed here.
Second, the task presented to the respondents was highly abstract and it is possible that the stimulus failed to adequately emphasize the changing patterns of health status over time. It is possible that using stimuli that are more dynamic in nature, may better represent changes in health over time than the 'static' representations used here. For example, Chapman (2000) used graphs to depict changes in the quality of health over time, which are arguably more appropriate stimuli to test for sequencing and duration effects than those used here. This is an issue that may be addressed in further studies.
Certain of our findings, however, are more difficult to explain. Whilst it seemed plausible that independence would be less likely to hold when the tests were presented in random order there is no obvious reason why test 1 should be significant in study two whilst test 5 is not (reversing the previous finding). We believe that more weight ought to be placed on the findings of the second of the two studies that controlled for ordering effects, but this remains a finding to be investigated further.
One way forward for future research would be to conduct a qualitative study alongside the quantitative tests to reveal those factors that were considered by respondents in formulating their responses. Such data may help determine whether there is a psychological explanation for those violations of independence that were uncovered here or whether they were an artefact of the study design.
More generally, it may be argued that asking respondents to consider the type of stylised, hypothetical scenarios used here, will necessarily fail to capture feelings of adaptation, savouring and dread that may matter to people in real life. Kahneman and Sugden (2005) distinguish between experienced utility (utility as hedonic experience) and decision utility (utility as a representation of preference) and argue that the latter will underestimate feelings of adaptation etc. Others may argue that if decision utility corresponds more closely to what people think should influence their choices and is more normative in nature, then decision utility is more relevant for economic evaluations that are principally normative in character.
Whilst it is not clear to us that we could (or even should 4 ) abandon the practice of eliciting values over hypothetical health states in utility assessment exercises, there may be particular problems inherent in attempting to assess preferences over sequences of health states.
Conclusions
We set out to see whether independence holds under conditions of uncertainty termed 'utility independence'. We find that utility independence holds in the majority of cases examined 4 As this would necessarily rule out the use of general population values for health states in favour of those of disparate groups of patients, making comparability and aggregation problematic.
here. In particular, changing the health state at either the beginning or the end of a profile did not have a significant impact on preferences over the remainder of that profile.
Even if further research supports the currently limited evidence that additive independence fails (Spencer, 2003) , then utility independence can be used as the basis to derive models that are tractable and can be applied to practical research. Whilst these models are unlikely to be as simple at the conventional QALY model, it does not sound the death knell for the use of QALYs in economic evaluation. • Your indoor activities are not limited.
• Your outdoor activities are not limited.
• You are full of energy.
• You are not in pain.
Compared to the average person that age;
• Your indoor activities are a bit more limited.
• Your outdoor activities are a bit more limited.
• You have a bit less energy.
• You are in a bit more pain.
• Your indoor activities are a lot more limited.
• Your outdoor activities are a lot more limited.
• You have a lot less energy.
• You are in a lot more pain.
